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Abstract 
Unconstrained CO2 emission from fossil fuel burning has been the dominant cause of observed 
anthropogenic global warming. The amounts of ‘proven’ and potential fossil fuel reserves are 
uncertain and debated.  Regardless of the true values, society has flexibility in the degree to 
which it chooses to exploit these reserves, especially unconventional fossil fuels and those 
located in extreme or pristine environments.  If conventional oil production peaks within the next 
few decades, it may have a large effect on future atmospheric CO2 and climate change, 
depending upon subsequent energy choices.  Assuming that proven oil and gas reserves do not 
greatly exceed estimates of the Energy Information Administration, and recent trends are toward 
lower estimates, we show that it is feasible to keep atmospheric CO2 from exceeding about 450 
ppm by 2100, provided that emissions from coal, unconventional fossil fuels, and land use are 
constrained.  Coal-fired power plants without sequestration must be phased out before mid-
century to achieve this CO2 limit.  It is also important to ‘stretch’ conventional oil reserves via 
energy conservation and efficiency, thus averting strong pressures to extract liquid fuels from 
coal or unconventional fossil fuels while clean technologies are being developed for the era 
‘beyond fossil fuels’.  We argue that a rising price on carbon emissions is needed to discourage 
conversion of the vast fossil resources into usable reserves, and to keep CO2 beneath the 450 
ppm ceiling. 
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1. Introduction 
 
M. King Hubbert, the late petroleum geologist and Shell oil company consultant, articulated the 
notion that oil production would peak when about half of the economically recoverable resource 
had been exploited.  His successful prediction of peak oil production in the continental United 
States (Hubbert, 1956) has encouraged numerous analysts to subsequently apply his model or 
variations thereof to global oil production.  The concept of peak extraction of a finite 
nonrenewable resource constrained by geology and geography has received support from similar 
patterns of growth, peak production, and decline of mineral resources (van der Veen, 2006), 
natural gas (Lam, 1998), and coal (Milici and Campbell, 1997) in specific regions. 
 There is intense disagreement about when global ‘peak oil’ might occur, but it is widely 
accepted that it will occur at some point this century (Wood et al., 2003; Kerr, 2005).  Despite 
the obvious relevance of peak oil to future climate change, it has received little attention in 
projections of future climate change.  
In this paper we emphasize the estimated magnitudes of fossil fuel resources (oil, natural gas, 
and coal), and the relevance of these limitations to the question of how practical it may be to 
avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with global climate as outlined in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992).  We are motivated by the 
conclusion of Hansen et al. [2007a,b] that “dangerous” climatic consequences are expected at 
atmospheric CO2 levels exceeding 450 ppm and possibly at even lower levels.  Thus we 
investigate whether atmospheric CO2 can be kept to 450 ppm or less via constraints on the use of 
coal and unconventional fossil fuel resources. 
In estimating atmospheric CO2 levels for given emission scenarios we employ both a linear 
atmospheric pulse response function (PRF) fit to the Bern carbon cycle model (Joos et al., 1996) 
and a non-linear mixed-layer PRF fit to the same Bern carbon cycle model.  The mixed-layer (or 
dynamic-sink) PRF allows non-linear ocean carbonate chemistry, which is not included in the 
atmospheric (static-sink) PRF.  The static-sink PRF underestimates CO2 levels for large emission 
cases, but we include results for this PRF because our main interest in cases that keep 
atmospheric CO2 at ~450 ppm, this PRF has the advantage of simplicity and transparency, and 
we have used this function in other studies (Hansen et al., 2007a,b).  We also include results for 
the dynamic-sink PRF.   
We do not attempt to resolve the debate about the timing of peak oil or the magnitude of 
fossil fuel resources; rather, we consider reasonable alternative assumptions.  We recognize that 
the magnitude of recoverable oil and gas resources depends on economic incentives and 
penalties.  Indeed, the disparity between those who believe that fossil fuels are running out and 
those who foresee large potential reserves most likely relates in part to assumptions based on the 
‘principle of substitution’ (Marshall, 1890), the neoclassical economics notion that implies that 
technology improvements and supply and demand dynamics will allow continual transfer of 
fossil fuels from resources to reserves.  
We suggest that the potential for “dangerous” climatic consequences should influence the 
degree to which such substitution remains unfettered.  Thus we discuss the possible need for a 
growing price on carbon emissions, if CO2 is to be kept to a low level. 
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2. Methods 
2.1 Fossil fuel supply estimates and terminology 
We use fossil fuel CO2 emissions from the historical (1750-2003) analysis of the United 
States Department of Energy’s Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC; Marland 
et al., 2006).  The record is extended through 2005 with data from British Petroleum (BP, 2006), 
with the BP data for each of the three fuels adjusted slightly by a factor near unity such that the 
BP and CDIAC data coincide exactly in 2003. 
Estimates of remaining fossil fuel reservoirs by the United States Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2006), World Energy Council (WEC, 2007), and the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001a) are shown in Figure 1.   In our calculations we consider 
combinations of estimates from these groups reflecting a wide range of fossil fuel supplies.  All 
estimates are shown in units of gigatonnes of carbon (1 Gt C = 1 Pg C = 1015 g C) for the sake of 
uniformity, as well as in units of atmospheric CO2 equivalent (1 ppm CO2 ≈ 2.12 Gt C). 
‘Proven reserves’ are the amounts of these fuels that are estimated to be economically 
recoverable under current economic and environmental conditions with existing technology.  
‘Resources’ are fossil occurrences whose existence is well-known but whose recoverable 
magnitudes are less certain; however, they are widely believed to contain immense amounts of 
fossil energy and carbon (e.g., see IPCC, 2001a). ‘Reserve growth’ is defined by EIA [2006] as 
expected additions to proven reserves (from resources) based on realistic expected improvements 
in extraction technologies. 
Reservoir estimates tend to be larger if they are made under the assumption of very high fuel 
prices, or if it is assumed that greater technology advances will allow recovery of a much higher 
percentage of fossil fuels in existing fields.  On the other hand, if a substantial carbon price is 
applied to CO2 emissions in the future, the available reservoir may decrease, as it becomes 
unprofitable to extract resources from remote locations or to squeeze hard-to-extract resources 
from existing fields.  Because of these uncertainties, we also consider a range of estimates of 
fossil fuel reservoirs. 
 ‘Unconventional’ fossil fuels are those that exist in a physical state other than conventional 
oil, gas and coal. The contribution of unconventional fossil fuels to CO2 emissions is negligible 
to date (IPCC, 2001a).  We do not include unconventional fossil fuels in the scenarios that we 
illustrate, because we are interested primarily in scenarios that cap atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm 
or less.  However, it should be borne in mind that unconventional fossil fuels could contribute 
huge amounts of atmospheric CO2, if the world should follow an unconstrained “business-as-
usual” scenario of fossil fuel use.  
 
2.2 CO2 emissions scenarios 
 We illustrate five CO2 emissions scenarios for the period 1850–2100. The first case, 
Business-As-Usual (BAU), assumes continuation of the ~2% annual growth of fossil fuel CO2 
emissions that has occurred in recent decades (EIA, 2006; Marland et al., 2006).  This 2% annual 
growth is assumed to continue for each of the three conventional fuels until ~half of each total 
reservoir (historic + remaining) has been exploited, after which emissions are assumed to decline 
2% annually. 
 The second scenario, labeled Coal Phase-out, is meant to approximate a situation in which 
developed countries freeze their CO2 emissions from coal by 2012 and a decade later developing 
countries similarly halt increases in coal emissions.  Between 2025 and 2050 it is assumed that 
both developed and developing countries will linearly phase out emissions of CO2 from coal 
usage.  Thus in Coal Phase-out we have global CO2 emissions from coal increasing 2% per year 
until 2012, 1% per year growth of coal emissions between 2013 and 2022, flat coal emissions for 
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2023–2025, and finally a linear decrease to zero CO2 emissions from coal in 2050.  These rates 
refer to emissions to the atmosphere and do not constrain consumption of coal, provided the CO2 
is captured and sequestered. Oil and gas emissions are assumed to be the same as in the BAU 
scenario. 
 The third, fourth, and fifth scenarios include the same phase-out of coal but investigate the 
effect of uncertainties in global oil usage and supply. The Fast Oil Use scenario adopts an 
alternative approach for calculating the peak in global oil emissions/usage, following the method 
of Wood et al. [2003]. It assumes that 2% annual growth in oil use continues past the midpoint of 
oil supplies, until the ratio of remaining reserves to emissions decreases to 10 yr from the current 
value of ~50 yr.  This scenario causes ‘peak oil’ to be delayed ~21 years to 2037.  The fourth 
scenario, Less Oil Reserves, uses the same trends as in Coal Phase-out but omits the oil ‘reserve 
growth’ term. This fourth scenario may be most relevant to a situation in which oil companies 
have been too optimistic about reserves and/or a high price on carbon emissions discourages 
exploration for oil in remote locations. Finally, the fifth scenario, Peak Oil Plateau, assumes that 
oil emissions exhibit a sustained peak from 2020−2040, using supply and 21st-century usage 
estimates of R. Nehring (Kerr, 2007). It assumes the global oil reserve base is ~50 Gt C larger 
than in our other scenarios (R. Nehring, personal communication, 14 June 2007; 
http://www.aapg.org/explorer/2007/05may/nehring.cfm). This scenario reflects the possibility 
that the peak productivity of major oil fields may occur at different times over the next several 
decades, leading to an extended, rather than abrupt, global oil peak. 
 In addition to fossil fuel CO2 emissions, we also include historical and projected estimates 
for net emissions from land use in each of the above scenarios. We use historical (1850−2000) 
land use emissions estimates from CDIAC (Houghton and Hackler, 2002), and projections from 
the midrange IPCC Special Report on Emissions (SRES) A1T scenario (values from IPCC, 
2001b).  
 These illustrative scenarios cover a broad range of fossil fuel reserves, but more extreme 
estimates do exist.  We quantitatively investigate the effect of very low estimates of natural gas 
and crude oil reserves (IPCC, 2001a) and coal reserves (WEC, 2007).  Although some analysts 
estimate reserves exceeding those in the illustrated scenarios, we do not study those because the 
cases we consider already reach far into the range of ‘dangerous’ atmospheric CO2 levels. 
 
2.3 Atmospheric CO2 projections 
 For each of the CO2 emissions scenarios we generate a time series of atmospheric CO2 using 
the following parameterization of the Bern carbon cycle model of Joos et al. [1996]:  
 
CO2 (t) = 18 + 14 exp(-t/420) + 18 exp(-t/70) + 24 exp(-t/21) + 26 exp(-t/3.4)      (1) 
 
where CO2 (t) is the percentage of emitted CO2 remaining in the atmosphere after t years, and the 
coefficients of each term are rounded from those provided in Shine et al. (2005). Note that 
Equation (1) implies that about one-third of anthropogenic CO2 emissions remain in the 
atmosphere after 100 years and one-fifth after 1000 years. 
 Equation (1) is a static-sink PRF for anthropogenic CO2 emissions, i.e. it is an approximation 
for the proportion (percent) of CO2 remaining airborne t years following an emission pulse.  The 
time evolution of atmospheric CO2 is obtained by taking the 1850 CO2 concentration as 285.2 
ppm (Etheridge et al., 1998), recursively applying Equation (1) to the emission scenario, and 
integrating the results from 1850 to year t. 
 We also investigate the same scenarios using a dynamic-sink PRF that incorporates some 
carbon cycle feedbacks. Both approximations are based on the Bern carbon cycle model with the 
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HILDA and 4-box biosphere models (equations 3-6, 16-17, A.2.2, and A.3 of Joos et al., 1996). 
The dynamic-sink PRF includes simplified non-linear ocean carbonate chemistry as well as 
biospheric carbon uptake and respiration (both for a fixed climate). We demonstrate that the 
dynamic-sink PRF yields slightly different quantitative results than the static-sink PRF (eq. 1), 
but the differences are small enough to only reinforce our conclusions.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Historical CO2 emissions and concentrations 
 Integration of the product of Equation (1) and fossil fuel emissions over the period 1850-
2007 yields an airborne fossil fuel CO2 amount of ~85 ppm in 2007.  The land use net emissions 
estimates of Houghton and Hackler [2002], with SRES A1T estimates for 2001−2007, yield an 
additional contribution of ~35 ppm in 2007. The CO2 amount in 2007 is thus overestimated by 
~20 ppm using eq. (1), or by ~13 ppm when the dynamic-sink PRF is used (Fig. 2). We suggest 
that, rather than a model deficiency, this overestimate is probably due to overestimate of net land 
use emissions (particularly for 1950−2000), based on the large uncertainties inherent in those 
estimates (Houghton, 2003), in contrast with the relatively high certainty of fossil fuel emissions 
estimates. Part of this discrepancy also may be due to the carbon cycle model.  When the land 
use emissions are reduced by 50%, as supported by other studies (e.g., see Ch. 7 in IPCC, 2007), 
the model−data differences amount to at most ~2% from 1850−2007 (Fig. 2). Although part of 
the discrepancy could be a result of ‘fertilization’ of the biosphere, via anthropogenic CO2 and 
nitrogen emissions, we show in a paper in preparation that incorporation of these effects in the 
carbon cycle model, as an alternative to reducing the land use source, has negligible impact on 
our present investigation.  All of our scenarios therefore assume the above reduction in the 
Houghton and Hackler [2002] estimates.  
 This calculation for 1850-2007 provides a check on the reasonableness of the carbon cycle 
approximation (eq. 1) for CO2 in the range 280-385 ppm.  We infer that the model may continue 
to provide useful estimates for scenarios with moderate fossil fuel emissions, i.e., for the 
scenarios of special interest that keep atmospheric CO2 less than or approximately 450 ppm.   
 As mentioned above and discussed in Section 3.4, for the larger CO2 emissions of BAU 
scenarios, Equation (1) may begin to underestimate airborne CO2, as it excludes the nonlinearity 
of the ocean carbon cycle as well as anticipated climate feedbacks on atmospheric CO2 and CH4, 
the latter being eventually oxidized to CO2.   
 
3.2 Projected CO2 emissions 
Table 1 provides an overview of the fossil fuel emissions and resulting atmospheric CO2 
amounts in our five emissions scenarios. We list peak fossil fuel emission years as ranges where 
necessary, to reflect minor differences in historical emissions estimates.  (For example, there are 
differences between the historic emissions of CDIAC [Marland et al., 2006] and EIA [2006].  
Also, relatively minor changes arise from year to year in the CDIAC fossil fuel data due to 
retroactive updates to the UNSTAT database [T. Boden, personal communication, 5 June 2007].) 
Additional features of our four mitigation scenarios are listed in Table 2. Figure 3 shows CO2 
emissions over time for the five main scenarios and Figure 4 shows the resulting atmospheric CO2 
concentrations.  
Peak oil emission in the BAU scenario occurs in 2016 ± 2 yr, peak gas in 2026 ± 2 yr, and peak 
coal in 2077 ± 2 yr (Fig. 3a).  Coal Phase-out moves peak coal up to 2022 (Fig. 3b).  Fast Oil Use 
causes peak oil to be delayed until 2037 (Wood et al., 2003), but oil use then crashes rapidly (Fig. 
3c).  Less Oil Reserves results in peak oil moving to 2010 ± 2 yr (Fig. 3d), under the assumption 
that usage approximates the near symmetrical shape of the classical Hubbert curve. In the Peak Oil 
Plateau case, oil emissions peak in 2020 and remain at that level until 2040 (Kerr, 2007), thereafter 
decreasing approximately linearly (Fig. 3e).    
Total fossil fuel CO2 emissions peak in 2077 ± 2 yr at ~14 Gt C yr-1 in the BAU scenario, 
almost double the current level, decreasing to ~9 Gt C yr-1 in 2100 and ~3.3 Gt C yr-1 in 2150 
(figure 3(a)). Fuel emissions peak in 2016 ± 2 yr at ~10 Gt C yr-1 in the Coal Phase-out scenario, 
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decreasing to ~1 Gt C yr-1 by 2100 (Fig. 3b). Cumulative 21st-century fossil fuel emissions are 
~1100 Gt C in the BAU scenario, ~500 Gt C in the Coal Phase-out scenario, ~520 Gt C in the Fast 
Oil use scenario, ~430 Gt C in the Less Oil Reserves scenario, and ~550 Gt C in the Peak Oil 
Plateau scenario.  
 
 
 
3.3 Projected atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
 Figure 4 shows atmospheric CO2 concentrations resulting from our fossil fuel emissions 
scenarios.  All of our scenarios include land use CO2 emissions from the midrange SRES marker 
scenario (A1T). Additional calculations (not shown here) reveal that the land use emissions 
projections of the high-end scenario (A2) would add ~5 ppm to all of our CO2 projections, while 
the low-end projections (B1) would cause a reduction by about the same amount.  
Peak CO2 in the BAU scenario is ~575 ppm in 2100, with fuel emissions alone raising CO2 to 
over 560 ppm (Fig. 4a). This is more than double the pre-industrial CO2 amount of ~280 ppm and 
already far past the 450 ppm threshold under consideration.  Likely nonlinearities in the carbon 
cycle with such large CO2 amounts would make the real-world peak CO2 even greater, as would 
any contribution from unconventional fossil fuels.   
 Our interest is primarily in scenarios that limit atmospheric CO2 to ~450 ppm or less.  
Therefore all scenarios other than BAU include phase-out of coal emissions at least as rapidly as in 
the standard Coal Phase-out scenario, which has moderate continued growth of global coal 
emissions until 2025, followed by linear phase-out of global emissions from coal between 2025 
and 2050.  This standard Coal Phase-out scenario has peak atmospheric CO2 at ~445 ppm in 2046; 
fossil fuels alone raise CO2 to ~428 ppm in 2047 (Fig. 4b). 
 The Fast Oil Use scenario (Fig. 4c) yields a peak atmospheric CO2 level of ~463 ppm with 
fossil fuels raising CO2 to ~446 ppm, i.e., faster use of the same oil amount increases the peak 
atmospheric amount by about 18 ppm.  However, in the absence of carbon feedbacks, this 
difference decreases with time, practically disappearing by 2100. 
The Less Oil Reserves scenario (Fig. 4d) yields a peak atmospheric CO2 level of ~439 ppm, 
with fossil fuels raising CO2 to ~422 ppm.  Thus omission of oil reserve growth (Fig. 1) reduces 
the peak atmospheric CO2 amount by ~6 ppm from the baseline Coal Phase-out scenario. 
Lastly, the Peak Oil Plateau scenario (Fig. 4e) yields a peak atmospheric CO2 level of ~456 
ppm, with fossil fuels raising CO2 to ~440 ppm. The sustained 20-yr peak in global oil emissions 
leads to an increase of ~10 ppm from the baseline Coal Phase-out case. 
 
3.4 Additional scenarios considered 
 Effects of using the dynamic-sink PRF of Joos et al. [1996] are shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
The mean 1960−2007 total CO2 airborne fraction of ~50% implied by the dynamic-sink PRF is 
lower than the ~53% based on the static-sink PRF, Eq. (1), and both are higher than the ~48% 
from observed airborne CO2 and assumed fossil fuel and land use emissions (Fig. 5).  The 
difference in the responses of the two PRFs to a pulse of 5 ppm CO2 (~10 Gt C) is not major, 
although it does persist for centuries (Fig. 6a). Despite this, there is little difference (less than 
~3%) between results from the two functions for the entire 21st century, regardless of whether 
high or moderate emissions are assumed (Fig. 6b,c).  However, the BAU scenario with 
unrestrained emissions diminishes the buffering capacity of the ocean, leading to a ~20 ppm 
increase in peak CO2 (Fig. 6b). On the other hand, with the lower emissions of the Coal Phase-
out scenario, the oceanic/biospheric CO2 uptake is similar for the two response functions (Fig. 
6c). 
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We also computed time series for emissions and atmospheric CO2 levels for several alternative 
sets of conventional oil, gas, and coal reserve estimates, including one from the World Energy 
Council (WEC, 2007) and one from IPCC (2001a, Table 3.28b).  These estimates are lower than 
the EIA [2006] estimates (Fig. 1), and therefore, even assuming BAU growth and decline (Section 
2.2), they yield earlier emissions peaks and lower peak atmospheric CO2 levels (Fig. 7).  
Specifically, WEC (2007) coal reserves (~450 Gt C ) yield peak coal emissions in ~2040, and 
IPCC (2001a) oil and gas reserves (118 Gt C and 82 Gt C, respectively) yield peak oil emissions in 
~2004 and peak gas emissions in ~2009 (Fig. 7a).  
Assuming the IPCC [2001a] oil and gas reserves  along with WEC [2007] coal reserves yields 
a peak atmospheric CO2 level of ~457 ppm in 2076, with fossil fuels alone raising CO2 to ~442 
ppm (Fig. 7b). Although this latter scenario represents relatively moderate ‘BAU’ cases, it relies 
heavily on the assumption that carbon-positive substitute fuels cannot or will not be developed in 
the future to replace declining conventional fuel reserves, e.g., due to a rising price on carbon 
emissions (see Discussion).  
 
3.5 Comparison with IPCC-SRES and EMF-21 scenarios 
In contrast with all of the above scenarios, peak total emissions in the four SRES scenario 
families (IPCC, 2000) range from ~12 Gt C yr-1 in 2040 (B1 marker scenario) to a staggering 
~28 and 29 Gt C yr-1 in 2100 (A2 and A1F1 marker scenarios, respectively).  Time-integrated 
21st-century emissions for these SRES marker scenarios range from ~970 Gt C (B1) to ~1900 
and 2100 Gt C (A2 and A1F1). Thus, it is clear that the high-end SRES scenarios implicitly 
assume that, in the absence of climate mitigation policies, massive amounts of unconventional or 
‘undiscovered’ resources will become viable substitutes for dwindling conventional reserves.  
Resulting atmospheric CO2 amounts in 2100 in the SRES scenarios range from ~540 ppm to 
~970 ppm, excluding carbon cycle feedbacks (IPCC, 2001b). Model simulations suggest that 
carbon cycle feedbacks under a high-end emissions scenario (A2) can yield an additional 20-200 
ppm of CO2 by 2100 (Friedlingstein et al., 2006). Note that our four mitigation scenarios, 
however, are consistent with current assessments of the cumulative 21st-century emissions 
needed to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm even after factoring in carbon cycle feedbacks 
(e.g., see IPCC, 2007).  
Our scenarios also differ from those of EMF-21 (Weyant et al., 2006) in several ways. First, 
their scenarios have a long-term global radiative forcing target of ~4.5 W m-2 above the pre-
industrial level, which yields a target global temperature rise of over 3°C, for nominal estimates 
of climate sensitivity (Hansen et al., 2007b; IPCC, 2007). Also, their mean model ensemble 
21st-century CO2 emissions are assumed to continually increase from ~14 Gt C yr-1 in 2025 to 
~25 Gt C yr-1 by 2100. Thus, like the SRES scenarios, the EMF-21 scenarios reflect climate 
change that we would classify as ‘dangerous’ and therefore highly undesirable. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Avoidance of ‘dangerous’ anthropogenic climate change 
 Practically all nations of the world have agreed that a ‘dangerous’ increase of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases should be avoided (UNFCCC, 1992), but the dangerous level of gases is not 
well defined.  Hansen et al. [2007a,b] have argued that additional global warming above that in 
2000 must be kept less than 1°C, and that, therefore, the dangerous CO2 level is at most about 
450 ppm, and likely less than that.  Although moderate trade-off with non-CO2 gases is possible 
(Hansen and Sato, 2004), CO2 is the most important climate forcing because a considerable 
fraction of fossil fuel CO2 emissions remains in the atmosphere for many centuries (Archer, 
2005).  Given that CO2 has already increased during the industrial era from ~280 ppm to ~385 
ppm, there is some urgency in determining what steps are practical to limit further growth of 
atmospheric CO2.  Indeed, the scenarios used in climate projections by the IPCC [2000, 2001a,b, 
2007] all have CO2 increasing well beyond 450 ppm. 
 On the other hand, fossil fuel reservoirs are finite, and existing deposits do not have to be 
fully exploited.  Also, it may be practical to capture and sequester much of the CO2 emitted in 
burning coal at power plants.  Thus it is important to estimate expected atmospheric CO2 levels 
for realistic estimates of fossil fuel reserves and to determine how the CO2 level depends upon 
possible constraints on coal use. 
 We suggest that, for the sake of simplicity and transparency, it is useful to make such 
estimates with simple pulse response functions for airborne CO2, although similar studies should 
also be made with comprehensive carbon cycle models.  We view the pulse response functions 
that we have employed as providing an approximate lower bound for the proportion of fossil fuel 
CO2 emissions that remain airborne. The uptake capacity of the carbon sinks may decrease if the 
CO2 source increases, and there are potential climate feedbacks that could add CO2 to the 
atmosphere, e.g. carbon emissions from forest dieback (Cox et al., 2000), melting permafrost 
(Walter et al., 2006; Zimov et al., 2006), and warming ocean floor (Archer, 2007). In addition, 
land use change and deforestation may remain a significant source of positive anthropogenic 
climate forcing this century, e.g., Gruber et al. [2004] assert that land use-related human 
activities could lead to the release of up to ~40 Pg C over the next ~20 years and ~100 Pg C this 
century due to the alteration of live biomass pools in tropical and subtropical ecosystems. 
On the other hand, if fossil fuel emissions of CO2 decrease, concerns about possible non-
linear positive feedbacks are diminished.  Indeed, we suggest a possible dichotomy of scenarios: 
if CO2 emissions decrease, the proportion of CO2 taken up by sinks could increase, with a 
resulting climate forcing that is much less than that in scenarios with continually increasing CO2 
emissions. 
Given these basic considerations, we have focused on scenarios in which coal use is phased 
out except where the CO2 is captured.  We find that, with such an assumption, it is possible to 
keep maximum 21st-century atmospheric CO2 less than 450 ppm, provided that the EIA estimates 
of oil and gas reserves and reserve growth are not significant underestimates. This limit on CO2 
is achieved in our scenarios only if cumulative global emissions from coal between the present 
and 2050 amount to ~100 Gt C or less. Thus, even if coal reserves are much lower than 
historically assumed (e.g., NRC, 2007), there is surely enough coal to take the world past 450 
ppm CO2 without mitigation efforts such as those described here. On the bright side, our findings 
indicate that a feasible time scale for reductions can keep CO2 below 450 ppm.  
 
4.2 Future use of fossil fuels 
Goals for atmospheric CO2 amount surely must be adjusted as knowledge about climate 
change and its impacts improves.  Recent evidence of sea ice loss in the Arctic and accelerating 
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net mass loss from the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets suggest that the allowable level 
of warming is likely less than 1°C above the 2000 global temperature and the CO2 limit is likely 
less than 450 ppm.  Thus, details about the magnitude of fossil fuel reserves and the rate at which 
the reserves are exploited may be important.  We find that the maximum 21st-century 
atmospheric CO2 level varies by ~18 ppm depending upon the rate at which given oil and gas 
reserves are consumed.  This variation decreases with time, however, so the size of the exploited 
oil and gas reservoirs is a more important consideration. 
The size of economically recoverable oil and gas resources is flexible, depending upon the 
degree to which fossil fuels are priced to cover their environmental costs.  Thus we have argued 
(Hansen et al., 2007a; Hansen, 2007) in favor of placing a significant rising price on CO2 
emissions.  One effect of a rising carbon price would be to slow the rate at which fossil fuel 
resources are exploited, thus reducing the maximum atmospheric CO2 amount, as illustrated 
above.  More importantly, a carbon price would result in some of the oil, gas, and coal being left 
in the ground, primarily deposits at great depths or in extreme environmental locations.  Given 
that the world must move beyond fossil fuels for its energy needs eventually, it is appropriate to 
encourage that transition soon, and thus minimize anthropogenic climate change.  We note that 
there are various ways of placing a price on carbon emissions, such as a progressive carbon tax, 
industry 'cap and trade' measures, or individual 'ration and trade' measures. The pricing scheme 
should be chosen based on economic effectiveness and fairness. 
Hirsch et al. [2005] note that it requires decades to remake energy infrastructure, and thus 
peaking of oil and gas production has the potential for severe economic disruption if steps are not 
taken to encourage technology development and implementation.  This consideration adds to the 
need for prompt actions to conserve readily available oil and gas, thus stretching out these 
conventional supplies, while encouraging innovations in energy efficiency and alternative (non-
fossil) energies.  Stretching of supplies is a principal function of an increasing carbon price.  
Nuclear power could be one viable alternative option, if strict provisions are followed for public 
safety, waste disposal, and elimination of potential weapons-grade by-products; adoption of an 
international nuclear environmental treaty could be a significant step toward this end (Robock et 
al., 2007).  
 
4.3 Additional climate change mitigation measures 
Finally, we note that, as understanding of climate change and its impacts improves, it is 
possible that even lower limits on atmospheric CO2 and the net anthropogenic climate forcing 
than discussed here may prove to be highly desirable. It has been suggested that to buy extra time 
to enact such large-scale mitigation, societies should adopt an approach that incorporates both 
emissions reductions and geoengineering options like periodic, sustained stratospheric sulfate 
aerosol injection (Crutzen, 2006; Wigley, 2006). However, a geoengineering “quick fix”, if not 
sustained precisely to the degree and length of time needed, could do more harm than good 
(Matthews and Caldeira, 2007), and it is difficult to define how much “fix” is needed. Thus, 
while geoengineering might provide some benefit, the potential gain must be weighed against 
long-term risks to climate and oceanic/stratospheric chemistry.  Especially given the existence of 
low-cost and no-cost methods to reduce CO2 emissions (Lovins, 2005), slowing of fossil fuel 
CO2 emissions warrants highest priority. 
Further reductions of anthropogenic climate forcing, beyond the 2025−2050 coal phase-out 
strategy that we quantified here, could be achieved as follows: 
(1) A freeze on new construction of traditional coal-fired power plants (without CO2 
sequestration) by 2010, with a linear phase-out of all such existing plants between 2010 and 
2030.  This action reduces the maximum atmospheric CO2 from ~445 ppm in our standard Coal 
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Phase-out scenario to ~400-430 ppm (depending on oil and gas reserve size). Fossil fuel 
contribution to atmospheric CO2 level decreases from ~428 ppm to ~390-410 ppm. 
(2) Intensive efforts to reduce non-CO2 anthropogenic climate forcings, especially methane, 
tropospheric ozone, and black carbon.  Hansen and Sato [2004] estimate that realistic potential 
savings from such reductions are equivalent to 25−50 ppm of CO2. 
(3) Anthropogenic draw-down of atmospheric CO2.  Farming and forestry practices that 
enhance carbon retention and storage in the soil and biosphere should be supported (McCarl and 
Sands, 2007), as should large-scale reforestation.  Direct removal of CO2 from the air through 
expedited carbonate formation also holds great potential (Lackner, 2003; Keith et al., 2006). In 
addition, burning biofuels in power plants with carbon capture and sequestration can draw down 
atmospheric CO2 (Hansen, 2007), in effect putting anthropogenic CO2 back underground where 
it came from. However, careful measures must be taken to ensure that biofuel production does 
not occur at the expense of food crops and tropical forests are not converted to biofuel farms. For 
instance, agricultural waste, natural grasses and other cellulosic material can be used (e.g., 
Tilman et al., 2006). Fertilizers used in their production should minimize emission of non-CO2 
greenhouse gases as well. CO2 sequestered beneath ocean sediments is inherently stable (House 
et al., 2006), and other safe geologic sites are also available. 
 12 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank Makiko Sato for providing the extrapolated historic CO2 emissions data for 2004 and 
2005 as well as the compiled historical CO2 concentration data. We also thank Gioietta Petravic, 
Fortunat Joos, Jackson Harper, Dave Rutledge, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful 
comments on the manuscript. Research support was provided by Hal Harvey of the Hewlett 
Foundation, Gerry Lenfest, and NASA Earth Science Research Division managers Jack Kaye and 
Don Anderson. 
 
 
References 
 
Archer, D. (2005), Fate of fossil fuel CO2 in geologic time, J. Geophys. Res., 110, C09 S05, doi:10. 
1029/2004JC002625 
Archer, D. (2007), Methane hydrate stability and anthropogenic climate change, Biogeosc. Discuss., 4, 993-1057. 
British Petroleum (BP) (2006), Putting energy in the spotlight: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2006, 
www.bp.com/pdf/statistical_review_of _world energy_full_report2006.pdf. 
Conway, T.J., P.M. Lang, and K.A. Masarie (2007), Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Dry Air Mole Fractions from the 
NOAA ESRL Carbon Cycle Cooperative Global Air Sampling Network, 1968-2006, Version: 2007-09-19, 
Path: ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/flask/event/ 
Crutzen, P. (2006), Albedo enhancement by stratospheric sulfur injections: A contribution to resolve a policy 
dilemma?, Clim. Change, 77, 211-219. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. Dept. of Energy (2006), International Energy Outlook 2006, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo06/index.html   
Etheridge, D.M., L.P. Steele, R.L. Langenfelds, R.J. Francey, J.-M. Barnola and V.I. Morgan (1998), Historical CO2 
records from the Law Dome DE08, DE08-2, and DSS ice cores, in Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global 
Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of 
Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A. 
Friedlingstein, P., et al. (2006), Climate-carbon cycle feedback analysis: Results from the C4MIP model 
intercomparison, J. Climate, 19, 3337–3353. 
Gruber, N., P. Friedlingstein, C. B. Field, R. Valentini, M. Heimann, J. E. Richey, P. R. Lankao, E-D. Schulze, and 
C. Chen (2004), The vulnerability of the carbon cycle in the 21st century: an assessment of carbon-climate-
human interactions, in The Global Carbon Cycle, edited by C. B. Field and M. R. Raupach, Island Press, 
Washington, pp. 45-76.  
Hansen, J. E. (2007), Dangerous human-made interference with climate, Testimony to Select Committee on Energy 
Independence and Global Warming, United States House of Representatives, 26 April 2007 (available at 
http://globalwarming.house.gov/list/hearing/global_warming/hearing_070423.shtml; updated version available 
at  http://arxiv.org/abs/0706.3720). 
Hansen, J. E., and M. Sato (2004), Greenhouse gas growth rates, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 101, 16,109-16,114. 
Hansen, J. E., et al. (2007a), Dangerous human-made interference with climate: a GISS modelE study, Atmos. 
Chem. Phys., 7, 2287-2312. 
Hansen, J. E., M. Sato, P. Kharecha, G. Russell, D. W. Lea, and M. Siddall (2007b), Trace gases and climate 
change, Phil. Trans. Royal Soc. A, 365, 1925-1954, doi:10.1098/rsta.2007.2052  
Hirsch, R.L., R. Bezdek, R. Wendling (2005), Peaking of world oil production: impacts, mitigation, and risk 
management, report to U.S. Dept. of Energy – Natl. Energy Technol. Lab. (avail. at 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/others/pdf/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf ). 
Houghton, R.A., and J.L. Hackler (2002), Carbon Flux to the Atmosphere from Land-Use Changes, in Trends: A 
Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A. 
Houghton, R. A. (2003), Revised estimates of the annual net flux of carbon to the atmosphere from changes in land 
use and land management 1850–2000, Tellus, 55B, 378-390. 
House, K.Z., D.P. Schrag, C.F. Harvey, and K.S. Lackner (2006), Permanent carbon dioxide storage in deep-sea 
sediments, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 103(33), 12291, doi:10.1073/pnas.0605318103 
Hubbert, M.K. (1956), Nuclear energy and the fossil fuels, Publication no. 95, 40 pp., Shell Development Company, 
Houston, Tex.  
 13 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2000), Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, edited by N. 
Nakicenovic and R. Swart, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001a), Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, edited by B. Metz, 
O. Davidson, R. Swart, and J. Pan, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001b), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, edited by 
J.T. Houghton, Y. Ding, D.J. Griggs, M. Noguer, P.J. van der Linden, X. Dai, K. Maskell, and C.A. Johnson, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, edited by S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. 
Miller, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
Joos, F., M. Bruno, R. Fink, T.F. Stocker, U. Siegenthaler, C. Le Quere, and J.L. Sarmiento (1996), An efficient and 
accurate representation of complex oceanic and biospheric models of anthropogenic carbon uptake, Tellus, 48B, 
397-417. 
Keeling, C.D. and T.P. Whorf. (2005), Atmospheric CO2 records from sites in the SIO air sampling network, in 
Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A. 
Keith, D.W., M.H. Duong, and J.K. Stolaroff (2006), Climate strategy with CO2 capture from the air, Clim. Change, 
74, 17-45. 
Kerr, R.A. (2005), Bumpy road ahead for world’s oil, Science, 310, 1106-1108. 
Kerr, R.A. (2007), The looming oil crisis could arrive uncomfortably soon, Science, 316, 351. 
Lackner, K. (2003), A guide to CO2 sequestration, Science, 300, 1677-1678. 
Lam, M. (1998), Louisiana short term oil and gas forecast, report to Louisiana Dept. of Natural Resources – 
Technol. Assessment Div. http://dnr.louisiana.gov/sec/execdiv/techasmt/oil_gas/forecasts/shortterm_1998/03-
production.htm. 
Lovins, A. B. (2005), More profit with less carbon, Scientific American, 293, 74-82. 
Marland, G., T. A. Boden, and R. J. Andres (2006), Global, regional, and national CO2 emissions, in Trends: 
Compendium of Data of Global Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, U.S. Dept. Energy, Oak Ridge, TN. 
Marshall, A. (1890), Principles of Economics, Macmillan and Co., London.  
Matthews, H. D., and K. Caldeira (2007), Transient climate-carbon simulations of planetary geoengineering, Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci., 104: 9949-9954 doi:10.1073/pnas.0700419104 
McCarl, B. A. and R. D. Sands (2007), Competitiveness of terrestrial greenhouse gas offsets: are they a bridge to the 
future?, Clim. Change, 80, 109-126. 
Milici, R. C., and E. V. M. Campbell (1997), A predictive production rate life-cycle model for southwestern 
Virginia coalfields, USGS Circular 1147 http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1147/  
National Research Council (NRC) (2007), Coal: Research and Development to Support National Energy Policy, 
The National Academies Press, Washington.   
Robock, A., O. B. Toon, R. B. Turco, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, and C. Bardeen (2007), The continuing threat of 
nuclear weapons: Integrated policy responses, Eos, 88, 228. 
Shine, K. P., J. S. Fuglestvedt, K. Hailemariam, and N. Stuber (2005), Alternatives to the global warming potential 
for comparing climate impacts of emissions of greenhouse gases, Clim. Change, 68, 281-302. 
Thoning, K.W., D.R. Kitzis, and A. Crotwell (2007), Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Dry Air Mole Fractions from 
quasi-continuous measurements at Barrow, Alaska; Mauna Loa, Hawaii; American Samoa; and South Pole, 
1973-2006, Version: 2007-10-01, Path: ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/in-situ/ 
Tilman, D., J. Hill, and C. Lehman (2006), Carbon-negative biofuels from low-input high-diversity grassland 
biomass, Science, 314, 1598-1600. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php  
van der Veen, C. J. (2006), Reevaluating Hubbert’s prediction of U.S. peak oil, Eos, 87, 199. 
Walter, K. M., S. A. Zimov, J. P. Chanton, D. Verbyla, and F. S. Chapin (2006), Methane bubbling from Siberean 
thaw lakes as a positive feedback to climate, Nature, 443, 71-75. 
Weyant, J. P., F. C. de la Chesnaye, and G. J. Blanford (2006), Overview of EMF-21: Multigas mitigation and 
climate policy, The Energy Journal, Special Issue, 1-32. 
Wigley, T. M. (2006), A combined mitigation/geoengineering approach to climate stabilization, Science, 314, 452-
454. 
 14 
Wood, J. H., G. Long, and D. Morehouse (2003), World conventional oil supply expected to peak in 21st century, 
Offshore, 63, 90 (online version available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/feature_articles/2004/worldoilsupply/oilsupply04.html)  
World Energy Council (2007), Survey of Energy Resources (21st ed.), edited by J. Trinnaman and A. Clarke 
http://www.worldenergy.org/publications/survey_of_energy_resources_2007/default.asp  
Zimov, S. A., E. A. G. Schuur, and F. S. Chapin (2006), Permafrost and the global carbon budget, Science, 312, 
1612-1613. 
 15 
Table 1.  Approximate peak fossil fuel CO2 emissions and atmospheric CO2 levels in each 
scenario. 
Scenario 
Peak fuel 
emission Year of peak 
Peak fuel CO2 
level Year of peak 
BAU 14 Gt C yr-1 2077 ± 2 yr  563 ppm 2100 
Coal Phase-out 10 Gt C yr-1 2016 ± 2 yr 428 ppm 2047 
Fast Oil Use 11 Gt C yr-1 2025 ± 2 yr  446 ppm 2046 
Less Oil Reserves 9 Gt C yr-1 2022 ± 2 yr  422 ppm 2045 
Peak Oil Plateau 10 Gt C yr-1 2025 ± 2 yr  440 ppm 2060 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Salient features and metrics of mitigation scenarios. 
Scenario 
2007−2050 coal 
emissions 
Total 2007−2050 
fuel emissions  
Reduction in 
2050 vs. 2007 
fuel emissions 
Coal Phase-out ~110 Gt C ~330 Gt C 57% 
Fast Oil Use ~110 Gt C ~390 Gt C 54% 
Less Oil Reserves ~110 Gt C ~300 Gt C 66% 
Peak Oil Plateau ~110 Gt C ~360 Gt C 40% 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Fossil fuel-related estimates used in this study. Historical fossil fuel CO2 emissions from 
the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC; Marland et al., 2006) and British 
Petroleum (BP, 2006). Lower limits for current proven conventional reserve estimates for oil and 
gas from IPCC [2001a] (dashed lines),upper limits and reserve growth values from US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2006). Lower limit for conventional coal reserves from World 
Energy Council (WEC, 2007; dashed line), upper limit from IPCC [2001a]. Possible amounts of 
unconventional fossil resources from IPCC [2001a].  
WEC 
IPCC 
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Figure 2. Computed vs. observed time evolution of industrial-era atmospheric CO2 from 
1850−2007. (CDIAC LU = Houghton and Hackler [2002] land use emissions for 1850−2000). 
Inclusion of the CDIAC LU emissions causes increasing overestimation of pCO2 by the model 
between 1950−2000 for both the static-sink and dynamic-sink PRFs, suggesting that those LU 
estimates may be overestimates (see Section 3.1). When the CDIAC LU estimates are reduced by 
50%, both PRFs produce very good agreement with observed CO2. Observations prior to 1958 are 
based on Law Dome ice core data (Etheridge et al., 1998), and from 1958 onwards based on high-
precision flask and in-situ measurements (Keeling and Whorf, 2005; Conway et al., 2007; Thoning 
et al., 2007), with the specific data series as concatenated and adjusted to global means by Hansen 
and Sato [2004]. 
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Figure 3. Historical and projected anthropogenic CO2 emissions for the five main scenarios (LU 
= land use).  
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Figure 4. Time evolution of atmospheric CO2 concentrations for the five main case scenarios. In 
each scenario, the computed amount of CO2 contributed by each source is added to the baseline 
1850 CO2 level of 285.2 ppm to generate the individual curves.  Compared with the control case 
(Coal Phase-out, panel (b)), the peak CO2 level in the Less Oil Reserves scenario is ~6 ppm lower, 
while the peak level in the Fast Oil Use and Peak Oil Plateau cases is ~18 ppm and ~10 ppm 
higher, respectively.  
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Figure 5. CO2 ‘airborne fraction’ (AF) of 1960−2007 anthropogenic CO2 emissions, computed as 
the mean measured atmospheric CO2 concentration of a given year minus the amount in the 
previous year divided by either the fossil fuel emissions in the given year (AF1) or the sum of 
fossil fuel and land use emissions in the given year (AF2). The 1960−2007 mean derived from  
observed CO2 is ~57% for the former (AF1 obs.) and ~48% for the latter (AF2 obs.). For the static-
sink and dynamic-sink PRFs, the 1960−2007 model mean AF2 values are ~53% and ~50%, 
respectively. (See Fig. 2 caption for CO2 data sources.) 
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Figure 6. Effects of using the static-sink PRF vs. the dynamic-sink PRF. (a) Annual fraction of 
CO2 remaining airborne after a pulse emission of 5 ppm (~10 Gt C), with differences highlighted 
at 100, 500, and 1000 yr. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations for the baseline (b) BAU and (c) Coal 
Phase-out scenarios. The difference is generally negligible (less than ~3% throughout the 21st 
century), but in the high-emission BAU scenario the dynamic-sink PRF yields ~20 ppm greater 
peak CO2 in 2100. 
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Figure 7. (a) Alternate ‘low-end’ BAU emissions scenario assuming conventional oil and gas 
reserves from IPCC (2001a) with no reserve growth, and coal reserves from World Energy 
Council [WEC, 2007] (LU=land use). (b) Resulting atmospheric CO2 from this scenario, compared 
with the baseline (‘high-end’) BAU scenario from Fig. 4a.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
